Why are cohabitation and extra-marital births so few in Japan?

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1. The second demographic transition in Japan

After the end of the 1950s when Japan completed fertility transition from the traditional high fertility regime to the modern low fertility regime, she kept around the replacement level of fertility up to the middle of the 1970s. But since then Japanese fertility sank below the replacement level and, by and large, continued to decline, reaching 1.34 in terms of the total fertility rate in 1999 (Figure 1). Such fertility decline was caused mainly by the postponement of marriage and childbearing and partly by the decline in marital fertility (Atoh, 1992; NIPSSR 2000; Ogawa, 2000). The proportion never married in the prime reproductive ages continued to rise since the middle of the 1970s up to now: Those proportions for women aged 25-29 and 30-34 increased from 21 to 48 percent and from 8 to 20 percent respectively between 1975 and 1995 according to the Population Census (Figure 1). The mean age at first marriage for women continued to rise by 2.5 years from 24.2 to 26.7 years old between 1970 and 1998 and, also, the mean age at the first childbirth rose by 2.2 years from 25.6 to 27.8 years old during the same period according to the Vital Statistics (SID-MHW, 2000a).

In addition, the crude divorce rate which had been very low level, around 0.7 per thousand population in the 1960s, began to rise since then and reached 1.94 per thousand population in 1998. The life-time probability of divorce increased from around one out of eleven marriages to around one out of six marriages between 1965 and 1990 (Takahashi, 1997). Related to such increase in the divorce rate, the proportion of remarriage for women among the total annual number of marriage doubled from around 6 percent in the 1960s to 12 percent in 1998 (SID-MHW, 2000).

All these demographic changes which occurred in Japan in the last quarter of the twentieth century were, more or less, common to those which occurred in the Western societies since the middle of the 1960s, so that such demographic changes in Japan may be called “the second demographic transition” (Van de Kaa, 1989). But there is one conspicuous difference in their demographic situation between Japan and the Western countries, especially the Northern and Western European countries: It is very low prevalence of cohabitation and extra-marital births in Japan. According to the Eleventh National Fertility Survey undertaken by NIPSSR in 1997, the proportions of never-married women aged 20-24, 25-29, 30-34 who were currently cohabiting with a non-married partner were only about 2.3, 1.0 and 1.5 percent respectively (NIPSSR, 1999). Also, according to the vital statistics, the proportion of extra-marital births
among the total annual number of live births has been only one percent-level, though it has been very moderately increasing (SID-MHW, 2000a). In contrast with Japan, the proportion of extra-marital births has been rising tremendously among all the Western societies in these thirty years, though there is currently a large difference in this proportion among them: between about 39 to 62 percent for the Nordic countries and about 4 to 15 percent for the Southern European countries in 1999 (Council of Europe, 2000). It is clear that behind such remarkable increase in the extra-marital births there has been a corresponding increase in cohabiting couples (United Nations, 1991; UNECE, 1997–2001).

Then, the question is why cohabitation and extra-marital births are so few in Japan which has had similar trends with the Western societies with respect to other demographic characteristics. This question deserves pursuing for the sake of shedding light on root-causes of very low fertility in Japan, because there is currently a strong positive cross-national correlation between the proportion of extra-marital births and the total fertility rate (Figure 2).

2. Why have cohabitation and extra-marital births increased so much in the Western societies?

Up to the middle of the 1960s, cohabitation and having extra-marital births have not been popular even in the Western societies. But they have continued to increase since then. Then, why have cohabitation and extra-marital births increased so much in the Western societies since then? There are at least three possible explanations for this question.

The first one is a technological explanation (Van de Kaa, 1989; Preston, 1987). The oral contraceptive pill was developed and came to be prevalent in the middle of the 1960s in the Western societies. The pill is different from other contraceptive methods which had been popular in the Western societies before the introduction of the pill, such as withdrawal (coitus interruptus), douche, or female clinical methods like diaphragm, foam or tablet, in the point that it was a female-dominant, coitus-free, easy-to-use and very effective method. With this method more Western women came to control their pregnancies and births as they wish without depending upon their partner. The availability of the pill is thought to have promoted “sex revolution”, that is, the rising of sex experiences among unmarried youth and cohabitation, because it led to the reduction of the fear of unwanted pregnancies among unmarried women. The increase of extra-marital births seems to have occurred after the sufficient increase of cohabitation, or in other words, after cohabitation was accepted in a society as a way of
life for the youth.

The second one is an explanation by women’s emancipation. More and more women have achieved longer and higher education, been engaged in gainful employment and continued to keep their job after marriage or childbearing in the Western societies since the 1960s. Wage differentials by gender have shrunk, so that women have come to be economically more independent. As women became socially and economically more equal to men, they desired to form an equal partnership with men. Since the traditional marriage form was, more or less, characterized by the breadwinner-homemaker system (Davis, 1990), more emancipated women chose to form cohabiting couples, expecting a more equal partnership in it.

The third one is an explanation by value change (Van de Kaa, 1989 and 1999; Lesthaeghe et al, 1988). Among younger people conformism with religious teachings has been weakened, confidence in the existing religious organizations has been reduced and tolerance toward anti-social behavior has increased. As younger people were more secularized, they came to cherish individual freedom of choice as opposed to existing institutional regulations. They came to place the highest value on the desire for self-actualization. Freed from the existing religion and morality, they began to determine their reproductive behavior as their individual rights for self-actualization. As a result, such reproductive behavior as extra-marital sex, cohabitation, extra-marital births, divorce and abortion which had been socially reproached before increased. While the age of the first demographic transition was that of “king-child”, the age of the second demographic transition became that of “king-pair”.

3. Why have cohabitation and extra-marital births not increased in Japan?

Now, let us turn to the question of the low prevalence of cohabitation and extra-marital births in Japan.

First, Japanese fertility transition in the 1950s was mainly brought about by the use of induced abortion which had been legalized by the Eugenics Protection Law in 1948 (: This law was renamed and revised as the Mother’s Body Protection Law in 1999). Contraceptive behavior started to prevail among married couples in the 1950s, gradually replacing abortion as a chief method for fertility control in the 1950s and 60s, but the contraceptive prevalence rate among married women reached a plateau of relatively low levels (around 60 percent) in 1970s and remained there up to now (Figure 3). Among contraceptive methods the condom and the rhythm method had been the two most popular methods for a long time, followed by withdrawal, but with the gradual decline in the use of the rhythm method the condom became the single most important
method for the contemporary Japanese married couples (Table 1). The use of female-dominant and effective methods, such as the pill, IUD and female sterilization, have been limited to the minority partly because of their legal ban or legal limitation for contraceptive use. Generally speaking, Japanese married couples have been able to achieve their family size goal, about just more than two children on average, by the use of male-dominant contraceptive methods, complemented by the relying on legal induced abortion in case of contraceptive failures (Atoh, 1982).

The oral high-dose pill was authorized in the 1960s for clinical purpose, but the oral low-dose contraceptive pill had long been banned and only in 1999 was authorized. Only a few percent of married couples had used the oral high-dose pill for contraceptive purpose before the legalization of the low-dose pill. Even after the legalization of the low-dose pill, the use of the pill did not increase among married couples (PPRC, 2000) (Table 1). It is difficult to guess real reasons why the low-dose contraceptive pill has not been legally authorized for a long time in Japan. But the fact itself seems to have reflected, first, conservative attitude among medical people, who had the decisive power to authorize the pill in the administration of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, toward reproductive freedom for women, especially unmarried women. Second, feminism movement has been weak in this field, too, in Japan, compared with other developed countries. This may be related to the fact that even highly educated women did not want to use available female-dominant contraceptive methods maybe due to their own conservatism or hesitancy to take an initiative in sex-related matters.

Even without the high availability of the pill, “sex revolution” occurred in Japan, too. According to time-series surveys on sexual behavior among students at various levels, the proportion of those who had sexual intercourse has increased at each level of schools in the 1980s and 90s (Figure 4). Among the unmarried people the main contraceptive methods are also overwhelmingly male-dominant ones such as the condom and withdrawal which have been popular among married couples (J ASE, 2000; PPRC, 2000). Partly because of this, the level of sexual activities among the single youth in Japan lagged far behind than in the Western societies: the proportion of women aged 20 having had sexual intercourse is at most 50 percent in Japan, while 80 to 100 percent in many Northern and Western European countries (J ASE, 2000; PPRC, 2000; NIPSSR, 1999; United Nations, 1991 and 2000). In accordance with the increase in sexual activities among the single, the number of pregnancies among single women aged high teens seems to have increased, judging from the fact of the increase in the rate of registered number of induced abortions for them from 3.1 to 9.1 per thousand population between 1975 and 1998 (SID-MHW, 2000b). Also, the proportion of
"shotgun marriage", that is, marriage with a pre-marital pregnancy, has increased probably in order to evade illegitimate births (Otani, 1993).

Under the situation in which the prevalence of female-dominant, effective and easy-to-use contraceptive methods, such as the pill, is low, pre-marital sexes and cohabitation would have a high risk of unwanted pregnancies and births, which would be accompanied, in turn, by the interruption of educational and/or occupational career for women unwillingly. Therefore, there is a possibility that a low prevalence of the low-dose pill affected by its long-term legal ban has been conducive to a low prevalence of cohabitation and extra-marital births in Japan.

Secondly, it is true that Japanese women have been socially and economically emancipated. More women have come to achieve higher education and the gender gap of educational attainment have shrunk in postwar years in Japan. More than 90 percent of female graduates of compulsory schools are enrolled in high schools since around the middle of the 1970s, and about 50 percent of those graduates advance to at least two-year colleges and just more than 25 percent of them advance to four-year universities (Figure 5). There has been an increasing tendency for female students to choose departments of universities that are useful for occupational career and are competitive with male students, such as laws, economics, engineering, medicine and pharmacy rather than literature, arts and home economics (DSSP-MOE, 2000). Women's labor force participation rates have increased since the middle of the 1970s at least up to the end of the bubble economy in the early 1990s (Figure 6). Wage differentials by gender have shrunk dramatically up to now (MOL, 2000).

Also, value systems on gender roles and families have changed gradually in this quarter of a century. Survey data collected before the middle of the 1970s showed that almost 80 percent of respondents, male or female and old or young, agreed with such views as “Women would better marry”, “Men work outside, women keep home” and “It is not allowable to get divorced, even if you are not satisfied with your spouse”. According the subsequent surveys, those proportions continued to decline and reached 40 to 60 percent-levels in the 1990s (Atoh, 1997) (Table 2). Also in the same period, the proportion of those who supports the view that women should continue their job even after their childbearing have increased from only about 10 percent-level to about 30 percent-level (Table 3).

Thus, Japanese women have changed their attitude as well as their behavior regarding their social and familial roles, though these changes have been gradual. But even highly-educated and/or professional unmarried women aged 20s and 30s have hardly dared to cohabit with their partner. This may be partly due to their hesitancy
to take initiative in sex and contraception, as was mentioned before, but also due to their expectation of traditional gender role division even in cohabiting couples, similar to married couples. According to a series of the National Time-Use Surveys, the average time spent by working married men for household chores, childcare and other family matters was only about ten minutes for weekdays and just less than one hour for Sundays in the 1990s (Table 4). The proportion of men’s time spent for those family matters in Japan seems to be the lowest among developed countries (Figure 7). The data from another survey showed that about two out of three unmarried women aged 18 to 49 said that they hesitated to get married because they might have less freedom or they thought marriage and work and hobbies were not easily compatible (Atoh, 1998). Also, the same data showed that about three out of four of the same women thought that once they get married they would have to mainly carry the responsibility of house-keeping and childcare (Atoh, 1998).

Such reality that men’s share in household work and childcare is extremely limited in married lives and such women’s deep consciousness of the fixed gender-role division may have been conducive for deterring unmarried women to form even cohabiting couples.

Thirdly, the data from a series of national surveys on views on religion and general morality for the general public showed that changes in general morality among the Japanese people have been very moderate in the four decades after the Second World War (IMS, 1994; Atoh, 1997). Certainly, people’s religious sentiment has been gradually weakened in general and they have come to have greater interest in personal life rather than in social and national affairs. For example, the data showed that the proportion of the respondents who replied “I venerate my ancestors” have gradually decreased from 77 percent in 1953 to 65 percent in 1993 (Figure 8). Also, the data on “philosophy about personal life” showed that in 40 years from 1953 and 1993 the respondents in favor of “living a life fitting my taste rather than seeking desire for money and fame” increased by 20 percent and those who supported “living a take-it-easy life, spending each day nonchalantly” increased by 15 percent, while those who supported “living cleanly and righteously, forcing out all evils in a society” and “living a diligent life to seek fame” and “devoting myself for the benefit of society instead of thinking solely about myself” decreased (Figure 9). In this sense, secularism and individualism have progressed also in the postwar Japan, though very moderately.

However, the change does not appear to be so large in Japan as in the Western societies where people place priority on the rights and freedom of individuals before anything else. For instance, the data regarding a question comparing individual
happiness with the status of entire Japan showed that in 40 years between 1953 and 1993 those who replied “It is only when Japan is improved that individuals become happy” decreased a little and those who replied “Japan becomes better only when individuals are happy” did not show any notable change (IMS, 1994). Another survey data for the youth showed that the rates of replies to the question on alternative attitudes between “The most important thing is to satisfy my own life” and “Satisfying my own life is not sufficient, and I would like to do things useful to society” remained almost unchanged for 15 years between 1977 and 1992 (YS-PMO, 1994).

Individuation seems to have not so much evolved as to break down traditional familism in Japan in which lineal parent-children relationships are regarded as more important than husband-wife (or man-woman) relationships probably, having its roots in the stem family system in the pre-modern Japan (Morioka, 1993). Traditional familism seems to bind even the mind and behavior of young people in the contemporary Japan.

First, a series of surveys on reproductive behavior undertaken in 1980s and 90s revealed that almost 40 percent of unmarried women aged 20s and 30s had had no boy friends and almost 50 percent of unmarried men aged 20s and 30s had had no girl friends (NIPSSR, 1999). According to another survey, about 70 percent of unmarried women having no boy friends said that they were not daring to look for their partners by any means (Atoh, 1998).

Secondly, about 80 to 85 percent of unmarried working women aged 20 to 34 stay at their parent’s home (Atoh, 1998). Among them about 60 percent said that they stayed there because it is economically difficult to live independently (Table 5). But judging from the fact that about 40 percent of those aged 30s who could live their own life independently if they desired so pointed to such economic reason, it is difficult to regard them as a reserve group for becoming independent from their parents. Among those who live away from their parents, only about the half said that they lived alone because they wanted to become economically and/or mentally self-reliant. All these data suggest that the orientation of self-reliance or independence from parents’ influence is very weak among young women.

If most of the young working women in the contemporary Japan is still bound by traditional familism, then it is very natural that they do not dare to live alone and eventually cohabit their partners.

4. Concluding Remarks

We have discussed why cohabitation and extra-marital births had hardly
increased in Japan in the last quarter of the twentieth century, notwithstanding she had had such demographic changes similar to the Western countries as the rising proportion of the single people, the continuous postponement of marriage and childbearing, the increasing divorce rate and fertility decline far below replacement level.

First, the low availability of female-dominant, effective and easy-to-use contraceptive methods, such as the oral pill, due to their legal limitation seems to have been partly responsible for this phenomenon in the sense that unmarried Japanese women would face the higher risk of unwanted pregnancies than those in the West if they cohabit. But behind their legal limitation was there conservative attitude connected with traditional familism among medical people as well as among many women.

Second, Japanese women have been emancipated socially and economically and their attitude toward gender roles in a family and in a society have changed gradually. But these changes have not led to the increase of cohabiting couples. This may be partly due to their conservative attitude toward sex and contraception but also partly due to their expectation of traditional gender role division even in cohabiting couples which is related to such reality as the very limited sharing of household chores and childcare by husbands in married couples.

Third, secularism and individualism have progressed very gradually in the postwar Japan, but individuation seems to have not so much evolved as to break down traditional familism in which lineal relationships are regarded as more important than husband-wife relationships, having its roots in the stem family system in the pre-modern Japan. The fact that more than 80 percent of unmarried working women aged even early 30s cohabit with their parents seems to show that they feel more comfortable at their parents' home and they have very weak motivation to leave it and form a cohabiting couple.
Reference


Figure 1. Trends in the Total Fertility Rate and the Proportion of Women Never Married by age

Figure 8. Religious Mind and Veneration of Ancestors

Note
A. Rate of respondents who replied "Yes. I believe in a religion" to the question "Do you have faith or religious mind?"
B. Rate of respondents who replied "I do" when asked "Do you venerate your ancestors, or rather not?"

Source: (IMS, 1994)
Figure 9. Philosophy about personal life

Note: "What do you think is the closest to express your thinking among the attitudes listed below?"

1. "Want to become rich"
2. "Seek fame"
3. "Live to my taste"
4. "Live on nonchalantly"
5. "Live a clean and righteous life"
6. "Serve for the benefit of society"

Source: (IMS, 1994)
Table 2 — Attitude toward the Gender Role Division by Sex: 1972-1992

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<th>Sub Agree</th>
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<td>1972</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>84 52 32 8 6 2 8</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>83 49 34 11 8 3 7</td>
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<td>1982</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>71.1 33.2 37.9 23.7 17.8 5.9 5.3</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>65.7 26.9 38.8 28.6 20.9 7.7 5.7</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>55.6 19.8 35.8 38.3 26.4 11.9 6.1</td>
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Q. Do you agree or disagree with the opinion that husbands should work outside the home and wives should keep their household?

Source: (PRS, 1972 and 1992; WAS, 1982)
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